CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Present State
OF
AFFAIRS
IN
EUROPE,

And particularly with Regard to the Number of Forces in the Pay of *GREAT-BRITAIN.*



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CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Preſent State of Affairs
IN
EUROPE, &c.

THE Clamours induſtriouſly raiſed againſt the Number of Forces, and particularly the *Heſſians*, which this Nation has of late Years from the Situation of Affairs been obliged to maintain; have determined me to examine impartially, whether the Augmentation and Continuation of the Forces in our Pay, *Britiſh* or

Foreigners, beyond what was uſual in Time of Peace, was a wiſe, juſt, and neceſſary Meaſure, in conſequence of Treaties made for the Intereſt of *Great Britain*, and the Preſervation of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*, independent of any other Intereſt and Conſideration whatſoever.

In order to put this Matter in a true Light, I ſhall firſt take a ſhort View of the State of Affairs that occaſioned the making of thoſe Treaties, and the Augmentation of Forces in conſequence of them.

That the Treaty of *Vienna*, concluded between the Emperor and *Spain* in *May* 1725, was the only Source and Foundation of all the Troubles that have diſtracted *Europe* for ſome Years paſt, muſt be allowed by all; and there is as little Reaſon to doubt, but that the Deſign of laying a Foundation for a formidable Power in *Europe*, by the Union of the two Families, was the chief Motive that induced thoſe Powers to make and ſupport, if poſſible, this Treaty, preferable to all other Views, and at the hazard of all other Events.

As ſoon as that Treaty was concluded, the Acceſſion was demanded of *England* and *Holland* by the Emperor, in a peremptory Manner, and the Refuſal of the Acceſſion

was

was follow'd with undeniable Proofs of a Deſign to deprive us of ſome of our Poſſeſſions; and both the *Dutch* and us, of ſome of our moſt valuable Privileges of Trade; and even to ſtrike at the preſent happy Eſtabliſhment of the Crown.

No ſooner was that Treaty ratify'd, but *Spain* required the immediate Reſtitution of *Gibraltar*, as a Condition of Peace and Commerce between the two Crowns; and made no Scruple, at the ſame time, to declare publickly their Reſolution to ſupport the Emperor by Force, in Maintenance of the *Oſtend* Trade and Company. Various Intrigues and Projects were ſet on foot at the ſame time in Favour of the Pretender. And all this was done without any Provocation on the Part of *Great Britain*, or without any Foundation for a Quarrel; or the leaſt Pretence for a Complaint, ſo much as alledged by the Allies of the Treaty of *Vienna* againſt the Conduct of the late King.

He was engaged in no Treaties that could give the leaſt Offence either to the Emperor or *Spain*, nor had taken any Steps that could diſoblige or provoke the Reſentment of either of them: He had acted as an impartial Mediator at *Cambray*, by Virtue of the Quadruple Alliance, for the Preſervation of the Peace; and had done nothing in Breach

of

of the particular Treaty of Friendſhip and Commerce made between him and *Spain*, in 1721. And therefore, however deſirous their Imperial and Catholick Majeſties might be to become Friends, and make up their Differences between themſelves; there could not be the leaſt Pretence for their doing it at the Expence of *England* or *Holland*, as it plainly appeared they did by the Nature of the Treaty of *Vienna*, and the Meaſures projected in conſequence of it.

Such undoubted Evidences in Facts of concerted Deſigns againſt the Intereſts of this Nation, not to ſay any thing of the Secret Articles belonging to that Treaty, called upon his Majeſty, to ſtrengthen himſelf with ſuch Counter-Alliances as might enable him to diſappoint or defeat thoſe Deſigns.

An Alliance with *Holland*, whoſe Intereſt in moſt Reſpects is inſeparable from that of *England*, was certainly the moſt natural and obvious on this Occaſion: But the Conſtitution of that Republick makes it almoſt impoſſible to keep a Negociation ſecret there; and the Situation of their Country, with Reſpect to the Emperor, might expoſe them, before they could be ſufficiently ſupported, to his Reſentment, for entring into a Negociation in Oppoſition to his Meaſures. Was it not therefore the moſt adviſable Step for the common

common Good of both Nations, that *England* being more immediately concerned in the dangerous Conſequences of the *Vienna* Treaty, and farther removed from the Effects of any ſudden Reſentment, ſhould firſt ſtrengthen her ſelf with ſome other conſiderable Powers, whoſe Intereſt it is to check the Imperial Power, by an Alliance, to which the Acceſſion of the *States* might afterwards become eaſy and ſecure?

Accordingly, the Treaty of *Hanover*, between *England*, *France*, and *Pruſſia*, was concluded the 3d of *September* 1725. And whatever particular Reaſons may have determined his *Pruſſian* Majeſty to withdraw himſelf from that Alliance; yet, conſidering with what a jealous Eye the Houſe of *Auſtria* hath all along looked upon the Increaſe of Dominions in the Family of *Brandenburg*, and how incompatible the real Intereſts of theſe two Courts are, the engaging the King of *Pruſſia* into the Treaty of *Hanover*, was in it ſelf a right Meaſure, and had for ſome time the deſired Effect.

And whatever Clamours may have been rais'd againſt an Alliance with *France*, as being unnatural to *England*, it was certainly in this Caſe, being made in Oppoſition to the Meaſures and Power of the Emperor, the moſt natural Alliance *England* could have.

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The Animoſities and Friendſhips between other Powers, may, according to new Incidents and Circumſtances, frequently vary; but the Oppoſition between the Emperor and *France*, muſt be conſtant in all Junctures and Events. They may be in Peace ſometimes, and have the Appearance of Friendſhip; but there muſt ever remain a Jealouſy at bottom, and ſecret Rivalſhip between them, and an unalterable Deſire in one to check the ambitious Views of the other: This hath ever been, and in all probability will ever be the Caſe, as long as thoſe two Powers, of *Auſtria* and *Bourbon*, continue to be ſo balanced, with reſpect to one another, as they are at preſent, and ſo ſuperior in Strength, as each of them is, to any other Power beſides.

But ſuppoſing *France* was not a proper Ally againſt the Treaty of *Vienna*, for preſerving the Rights and Poſſeſſions of *Great-Britain*, for which I will allow that *France* abſtractedly might have no great Concern; yet as this Treaty was the Bond of a ſtrict Union between the Emperor and *Spain*, and as that Union was founded upon the Proſpect of Marriages between the Infants of *Spain* and the Arch-Dutcheſſes, it muſt neceſſarily create the greateſt Alarm and Uneaſineſs to *France*; for ſhould thoſe Marriages have been ac-

accompliſhed, they would have occaſion'd an entire Separation in Intereſt and Friendſhip of *Spain* from *France*, and the Death of one particular Prince might have render'd the Houſe of *Auſtria* more powerful and formidable than ever, by the Re-union of Dominions that were once ſo terrible to that of *Bourbon*: and therefore, as long as the Union between the Emperor and *Spain* ſubſiſted, on the Views above-mentioned, *France*, on account of her own Intereſt, was the Power with which *England* might ſafely, and ought even preferably to any other, to make an Alliance at that Juncture, in order to obviate and defeat the dangerous Deſigns of the *Vienna* Treaty: For *France* could never hope to compaſs the Diſſolution of an Union ſo prejudicial to her, without reſolving at the ſame time to be faithful to her Engagements, in ſupport of the Intereſt of thoſe who ſhould be united with her in the ſame Cauſe.

This being the Situation of Affairs, the late King would have been wanting, in a due Concern for the Good of this Nation, for the Balance of *Europe*, and for the Dignity of his Crown, had he not fortified himſelf with the Treaty of *Hanover*, in Oppoſition to that of *Vienna*; the pernicious Conſequences of which, with reſpect to the Poſſeſſions and Trade of *Great Britain*,

were already but too evident: But his *Unwillingneſs* to involve his Subjects in a War, and *to put them to an extraordinary* Expence, by *any unneceſſary Precautions*, made him content himſelf, at the opening of the Parliament on the 20th of *January* 1725-6, with acquainting them with his having made this defenſive Alliance; without demanding more than the ſame Forces that were employed before theſe Troubles began, which were ten thouſand for the Sea Service, and eighteen thouſand Landmen.

In the mean time, the Conſequences of the *Vienna* Treaty began to ſhew themſelves openly, and the formidable Effects of it to be felt in moſt Parts of *Europe*; the Emperor found Means to detach the King of *Pruſſia*, who hath a ſtanding Force of about ſeventy thouſand Men, from the *Hanover* Treaty. Great Remittances of Money were made from *Madrid* to *Vienna*. A Plan was framed for an extraordinary Augmentation of the Imperial Forces with between thirty and forty thouſand Men: And Negociations were warmly puſhed in various Courts, both in the Empire, and the *North*, for hiring great Bodies of Troops. Theſe Negociations ſucceeded ſo well, by the Help of Subſidies from *Spain*, that ſome of the Electors, and other Princes of the Empire, engag-

engaged to furniſh about twenty ſeven thouſand Men; and the Czarina having acceded to the *Vienna* Treaty, agreed to find a Body of thirty thouſand Men for the Service of the Emperor and *Spain*.

Theſe vigorous and warlike Preparations on the part of thoſe Powers, to make themſelves formidable on all ſides, did neceſſarily oblige the *Hanover* Allies to concert the proper Meaſures for their mutual Defence, and for preventing a new War being kindled in *Europe*. Any further Delays, to provide for Action, would have been dangerous; and his Majeſty had Recourſe to his Parliament, for increaſing the Number of Seamen, and for Allowance for ſuch extraordinary Expence as the Service might require, which was agreed to by an Addreſs of the Houſe of Commons on the 25th of *March* 1726; who deſired him, *not only to increaſe his Number of Seamen, but to concert ſuch other Meaſures, as would beſt conduce to the Security of the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom, and the Preſervation of the Peace of* Europe; *with Aſſurances, that they would effectually make good all ſuch Expences and Engagements, as ſhould be made for obtaining thoſe great and deſirable Ends.*

At this Juncture, and in Conſequence of the Meaſures concerted between his Majeſty and his Allies, the late King agreed with the Landgrave of *Heſſe Caſſel* for a Body of twelve thouſand *Heſſians*, to be ready to march for his Majeſty's Service upon Demand.

France likewiſe increaſed their Forces, for the ſake of the Common Cauſe, with about thirty thouſand Men: And gave Orders for raiſing ſixty thouſand Militia to garriſon their Towns, by which they might be enabled to march all their Regular Troops into the Field, amounting to near one hundred and ſixty thouſand Men.

In the mean time, the *Hanover* Alliance having been communicated to the *States General*, they acceded to it; and in Conſequence of this Acceſſion, the *Dutch* immediately proceeded to an Augmentation of their Troops, which they increaſed from about thirty thouſand to above fifty thouſand Men; requiring at the ſame time that *England* and *France* would have their reſpective Quotas of twelve thouſand Men in Readineſs and at hand for the Defence of the Republick, in caſe of an immediate Attack; which they had more Reaſon to apprehend than any of the Allies, on account

count of their Situation with Reſpect to the Imperial Garriſons in the Low Countries on one ſide, and of their being expoſed on the other to the Forces of the King of *Pruſſia*, who had been lately gained by the Emperor.

This equitable Demand on the Part of the *States* could hardly have been anſwered by the King, if he had raiſed no Troops but in *England*. The *Dutch* are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the tranſporting great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon ſuch Help in a Caſe, which if it happened at all, would be ſudden and too quick to be withſtood by ſlow Movements. The View of this made it neceſſary to have foreign Troops properly placed; and the having them was the only thing that enabled the King to do Juſtice to his Allies on this Occaſion, by promiſing the *Dutch* that the twelve thouſand *Heſſians* taken into his Pay, ſhould march, in caſe of need, to their Aſſiſtance; and the *French* agreed to have as many of their *Swiſs* Troops on the Side of *Flanders* for the ſame Service.

While the Imperial Negociations ſucceeded ſo well in the Empire and the *North*, the Application of the *Hanover* Allies, for ſecuring

curing the Courts of *Sweden* and *Denmark* to their Intereſt, was no leſs ſucceſsful: *Sweden* acceded to their Treaty, and beſides their Quota of five thouſand Men, agreed to have a Body of ten thouſand Men ready for the Common Cauſe; in Conſideration of fifty thouſand Pounds, to be paid for three Years by *France*, and as much by *England*.

About the ſame time, the Convention of *Denmark* was finiſhed, by which that Crown engaged to have a Body of twenty four thouſand Men, ready to be reinforc'd with ſix thouſand more; for the Expence of which, *France* agreed to pay a Subſidy of 35000 Rixdollars *per Annum* for four Years; and in caſe of a War, to take twelve thouſand of them into their actual Pay. His Majeſty, as Elector, promiſed twelve thouſand Men to join the twenty four thouſand *Danes*, and to have likewiſe twelve thouſand more for a Reinforcement. By the ſame Treaty, *France* ſtipulated to furniſh thirty thouſand Men, as Occaſion ſhould require, for the Service of the Allies, in the Empire or the *North*.

His Majeſty's Land-Forces in *England* were augmented this Year with about eight thouſand Men; and he likewiſe encreaſed his

his Electoral Troops from ſixteen thouſand to twenty two thouſand Men.

But here perhaps it will be asked, What hath *Great Britain* to do with this String of foreign Troops? What have we to apprehend from the Forces of *Pruſſia*, *Muſcovy* or the Emperor? What Good can the *Swedes*, the *Danes*, the *Heſſians*, or *Hanoverians* do us? It was our buſineſs to lie by, to wait, and ſee the Conſequences and Events of the *Vienna* Treaty, and to take our Meaſures accordingly at a proper Seaſon. This indeed would have been a very prudent Step, if the Terms of the *Vienna* Treaty, and the Meaſures taken, and the Forces raiſed in Conſequence of it, by the Contracting Parties, had not been directly levelled at the Intereſt of *Great Britain:* This would be a very plauſible Doctrine, if the Poſſeſſions of *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, if the Trade to *Italy* and *Spain*, to the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-Indies*, and the *Baltick*; if the Balance of *Europe*, and the preſent happy Eſtabliſhment, were become indifferent things to this Nation; as indeed one would think they were, eſpecially the laſt, by the Weekly Licentious Writings of ſome Gentlemen, who would be thought to be Men of no little Conſequence. But as I do not believe that the Nation is yet grown quite weary of the

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Benefit of Foreign Trade, or of the Reign of the preſent Royal Family over us; and as thoſe eſſential and valuable Points were ſtruck at, ſome by the very Terms, and others by the immediate Conſequences and Secret Articles of the Treaty of *Vienna*, I am perſuaded that even thoſe, who clamour ſo loudly againſt what has been done, would have cenſured the Adminiſtration, as guilty of the greateſt Indolence and Folly, had they neglected to make the Treaties, to concert the Meaſures, and provide the Forces above-mentioned, for the Security of our happy Eſtabliſhment, for the Preſervation of our Rights and Poſſeſſions, and of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*.

Let us now take a ſhort View of the State of the Confederate Forces, as they ſtood ranged on one Side or the other, in Favour of the Treaties of *Vienna* or *Hanover*, in the Year 1727; when the Preliminaries were ſigned.

The Augmentation of the Emperor's Forces by Recruits, or additional Troops, was between Thirty and Forty Thouſand Men, which made his whole Number Two Hundred Thouſand. By the Treaties he had made with the Electors of *Bavaria*, *Palatine*, *Cologne* and *Treves*, and other Princes

ces of the Empire, he had ſecured to his Service about twenty ſeven thouſand Men; and by the Alliance with the Czarina thirty thouſand. He had likewiſe engaged the King of *Pruſſia* in his Intereſt, who has an Army of ſeventy thouſand Men.

The Forces of *Spain* might be reckoned to be about ſixty thouſand Men, beſides their Naval Power.

On the other Side, *Great Britain* had increaſed her Land Forces from about eighteen thouſand to about twenty ſix thouſand Men; which was an Augmentation above the Complement we had before the Troubles began, of about eight thouſand Men only. The Parliament likewiſe voted for this Year's Service twenty thouſand Seamen; which being computed into the Service of the preceding Year, when only ten thouſand Men were voted, though more were employed, it may be reckoned that we employed five thouſand more Seamen each Year, than in Time of Peace. Beſides our Land and Sea Forces at home, the twelve thouſand *Heſſians* were continued in our Pay.

The *French* had augmented their Regular Troops with about thirty thouſand Men,

which increaſed their whole Army to about an hundred and ſixty thouſand Men. They had likewiſe filled their Magazines, and provided Artillery and all ſorts of Ammunition ready for taking the Field; they had alſo got a diſciplined Militia of about ſixty thouſand Men, and they fitted out for the Sea Service of this Year twelve Men of War.

The *Dutch*, from their Acceſſion to the Treaty of *Hanover*, in the Year 1726, had increaſed their Forces from about thirty thouſand to above fifty thouſand Men; an Augmentation of about twenty thouſand beyond what they had in time of Peace: And they had likewiſe made Preparations to fit out eighteen Men of War.

The Quota of *Sweden*, by virtue of their Treaty, was five thouſand Men, and they were alſo to have ready on Demand ten thouſand Men more, by virtue of a Subſidy to be paid for three Years by *England* and *France*.

By the Convention with *Denmark*, that Crown was to provide a Body of twenty four thouſand Men, to be reinforced with ſix thouſand more, for a Subſidy paid by *France* for four Years.

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The King, as Elector, had increas'd his Troops, from ſixteen thouſand to twenty two thouſand Men.

By this State of the Forces on each Side, it is plain, that the Meaſures and Motions of the *Hanover* Allies, gradually attended the Motions and Meaſures of thoſe of *Vienna*; that their Counſels were prudent and ſteady; that they did not provoke and precipitate a War on one Hand, while they took care on the other, not to be forced, for fear of a War, and for Want of timely preparations, into baſe and diſadvantageous Terms. It is no leſs evident, that the Forces provided by *Great-Britain*, were no more than a ſuitable Contingent, in Proportion to the Forces provided by the reſt of the Allies engaged in the ſame Cauſe.

Thus Matters ſtood in 1727, when almoſt all the Powers of *Europe* were directly or indirectly engaged, and ranged on the Side of the Treaty of *Vienna* or *Hanover*.

The Meaſures of the firſt had been ſo well concerted, by the early Remittances of great Sums of Money from *Madrid* to *Vienna*, by the Acceſſion of ſo many Princes, by the Acquiſition of ſuch a Number of Forces in

the Empire, and the *North*, that their Imperial and Catholick Majeſties thought their Plan for uniting their Families, and for laying the Foundation of a formidable Power in *Europe*, could not fail. They imagined, that *England* and *Holland*, deſtitute of Friends, exhauſted by former Wars, apprehenſive of loſing their Trade and Poſſeſſions, threatned on one Side by the Forces of the Emperor, and on the other by thoſe of *Spain*, muſt have acceded to their Treaty, and have ſerved to ſtrengthen and confirm their Scheme of exorbitant Greatneſs. But when the unnatural and incompatible Alliance, as it hath been called, between *England* and *France*, came to be fortified by the Acceſſion of the *States*, and of other conſiderable Powers; when a proportionable Number of Forces, in Oppoſition to thoſe of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, were provided; when a Plan of Operations was framed, and the Allies appeared ready to take the Field for their mutual Defence, and for preſerving the Peace and Balance of *Europe*; while at the ſame time the Galleons (the great Reſource for ſupporting the vaſt Deſigns of the Emperor and *Spain*) were detained in the *Weſt-Indies*; the Imperial Miniſters began to change their Language and Views: They would not venture to employ the Troops they had raiſed and hired, in beginning a War; nor ſecond *Spain*

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in the Siege of *Gibraltar*, by making an offenſive Diverſion in other Parts; and therefore they cauſed Inſinuations to be made to the *Hanover* Allies, of their Deſire to have Matters accommodated in an amicable Manner: That it ſhould be agreed in general, to put Things on the Foot they were before the making of the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover*; and that whatever Differences remained between the contracting Parties, or their reſpective Allies, ſhould be adjuſted by way of Negociation at a Congreſs.

A Plan of Preliminaries was accordingly framed by the *Hanover* Allies, and ſent to *Vienna*; the Emperor agreed to ſign them in *May* 1727, without ſtaying for the Conſent and Approbation of *Spain*; which paved the Way, as it naturally muſt do, for the Diſſolution of the Alliance between his Imperial Majeſty and the King of *Spain*.

By this Means a Stop was put to all Hoſtilities in *Europe*. But *Spain* being provoked at theſe Steps towards a general Pacification, and having entertained ſome ſmall Hopes of Diſturbances in *England* on account of the late King's Death, thought fit to diſpute the Execution of ſome of the Articles relating to Trade; and conſequently Hoſtilities ſtill continued between that Crown and *England* in

in the *Weſt-Indies*, which prevented the Meeting of the Congreſs. However, *England* did not ſlip this Opportunity of diminiſhing their Expence; for immediately upon the ſigning of the Preliminaries, three thouſand four hundred and twenty eight Men were ſent back to *Ireland*; while the Allies ſtill kept the ſame Number of Forces on Foot.

This Diſpute with *Spain* continued till *March* 1728, when by the Steadineſs and Union of the Allies, ſhe was brought to comply; and by an Act ſigned the 6th of that Month, *N. S.* all the Difficulties that retarded the Execution of the Preliminaries were removed; and in Conſequence of it, the Congreſs was opened at *Soiſſons* the 16th of *June* following.

Theſe were the happy Effects of the Treaty of *Hanover*, and of the prudent Meaſures and Preparations thereupon; a War that threatned all *Europe* was prevented, and a Foundation laid for bringing about the Diſſolution of the formidable Union between the Emperor and *Spain*.

Here perhaps it may be asked, Why were not all the Troops, Domeſtick or Foreign, in our Pay, beyond the uſual Complement in time

time of Peace, discharged after the War was prevented, the Preliminaries signed and ratified, and the Congress opened? What further Occasion was there for any extraordinary Forces? In answer to this Question, another may be asked; What did *England*, or indeed any other Country ever get by laying down Arms, or disbanding Forces, in order to make Peace? They have very short Memories who have forgot the Consequences of such a Conduct; but in the present Case, the Reasons will appear still stronger, if we observe the Circumstances and Nature of this Congress. Other Congresses were generally assembled after a War, in which the Superiority and Success of Arms on one Side, had disposed the other to sue for Peace, and consequently made the conquering Party Master of the Negociations: So that as soon as the Preliminaries were once settled, there was little to be done but to reduce them into a formal Treaty for their final Sanction; because the Fate of Arms had put the weakest Side under a Necessity to submit, in those Points which had been contested and occasioned the War. But in this Case, where each Side had only made Preparations for a War; where Fortune had not decided the Cause for either; both Parties met at the *Congress* upon an equal Foot to countenance and support their respective Pretensions, and it was

easy

eaſy to be conceived, that neither Side would be ſo weak and imprudent, as to venture to diſarm, and by that means being naked and defenceleſs, give the Adverſary the Advantage of debating his Pretenſions Sword in Hand: And conſequently, as the Emperor and his Allies continued to keep up the ſame Number of Forces as they had before the Congreſs, *England*, *France*, and *Holland* were obliged to do the ſame. And this is the plain Reaſon why the Parliament, notwithſtanding the ſigning of the Preliminaries, and the Meeting of the Congreſs at *Soiſſons*, wiſely voted for the Years 1728, and 1729, twenty two thouſand nine hundred fifty five Land Forces, and the Continuation of the twelve thouſand *Heſſians*. And indeed it would have been a moſt diſhonourable and unjuſt Part, with reſpect to our Allies, as well as the weakeſt that could have been acted with reſpect to our own Intereſt, if we had offer'd to diminiſh the Number of Domeſtick or Foreign Troops in our Pay, at the ſame time that our Adverſaries kept up theirs; and that not only *France* ſtill maintain'd their additional Forces of Thirty thouſand regular Troops, and ſixty thouſand Militia, but even the Republick of *Holland* continued to pay twenty thouſand Men more than they had before the Troubles began; an Expence which no body doubts

doubts but they would be glad to be rid of, as ſoon as their own Safety, and their Engagements towards their Allies, would permit.

Any Diminution therefore of our Forces at this Juncture would have been deſtructive to the whole Alliance; and in Regard to our own Intereſt, a moſt imprudent Meaſure: Becauſe the Conduct of *Spain* made it but too evident, that the Points which were likely to be moſt ſtrongly conteſted at the Congreſs, were ſuch as immediately concerned the Intereſt of *England*, and of *England* alone; I mean *Gibraltar*, and the Privileges of our Trade.

The Preliminary Articles, by a Confirmation of all Rights and Poſſeſſions according to former Treaties, had indeed ſufficiently ſecured to us theſe Points; but as *Spain* hath ever had at Heart the Recovery of *Gibraltar*, and as the pretended Abuſes of the *Aſſiento* Trade had been extremely magnify'd; and the Advantages of theſe two Points to *Great Britain*, were look'd upon with a jealous and invidious Eye by other Powers; the *Spaniards* thought that nothing was more likely to create a Diviſion among the Allies, than the bringing of them into Queſtion, in which they were extremely

encouraged by the Oppoſers of the Adminiſtration, the pretended Patriots in *England*.

Theſe Gentlemen made it their Buſineſs to undertake to prove, that his late Majeſty, by a Letter he had written to the King of *Spain*, was engaged to reſtore *Gibraltar*: They made it their Buſineſs to endeavour to ſhew, that the Privileges of the *Aſſiento* Trade had been forfeited by the fraudulent Method of carrying it on: They induſtriouſly gave it out, that neither *France* nor *Holland* would or could with Juſtice ſupport us in theſe Points; that Friends and Enemies, nay all *Europe*, were againſt us in them; while at the ſame time they vehemently inveigh'd againſt the Miniſtry, as if they had not taken ſufficient Care to ſecure and maintain them: And thus while they themſelves were the moſt forward and inſtrumental to make us loſe theſe valuable Rights and Poſſeſſions, they began to be the moſt forward and loud, to complain and clamour at the Loſs of them.

The Steadineſs and Fidelity of our Allies prevented the Affair of *Gibraltar*, and the Diſputes in Trade, from being brought before the Congreſs; but had we immediately, upon the Meeting of the Congreſs, reduced our

our Forces, and discharged the *Hessians*; had the Crown of *Great Britain* appeared there in a weak and naked Posture, entirely defenceless and indifferent, with respect to our own and the Pretensions of our Allies; we must not only have given up *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, but all Benefits of Commerce which the Emperor and *Spain* had thought fit to demand. Could we have expected that *France* and *Holland* should with their Power and Strength have supported our Advantages, and such Advantages which it is pretended they envy our having, while we appeared at the same time not only not in a Condition and Readiness to second their Pretensions, but even destitute of Strength and Power to support our own? This is so absurd a Way of Reasoning, that it it was not so frequent in the Mouths of the pretended Patriots, it would not be worth while to mention it.

The War then was prevented; Articles for putting all Rights and Possessions on the Foot they were before the Troubles began, had been signed and ratify'd: But as several Differences and Pretensions, whether well or ill founded, still subsisted; As the Emperor and *Spain* still continued united, the Work was but imperfect: a farther and more extensive Treaty was wanting, and consequent-

ly the ſame Appearance of Steadineſs and Force that prevented a War, was neceſſary to compleat a General Pacification.

What paſt at the Congreſs, from the Opening of it to the framing of a Project of a Proviſional Treaty, is not very material to the preſent Purpoſe. Upon the Whole, the Union and Firmneſs of the Allies in Force and Councils, diverted the oppoſite Party from bringing before the Congreſs any Matters of great Importance, or from pretending to conteſt with them any of their known Rights and Privileges; and the Imperial Plenipotentiaries were drawn by Degrees into a Separate Negociation of a Plan for a General Treaty; and this was managed in ſuch a Manner, that the *Spaniſh* Ambaſſadors were ſcarce apprized of it, which made them think themſelves, and the Intereſt of their Maſter, neglected and abandon'd by the Imperial Miniſters: They loudly complained of this Uſage, and made ſtrong and vehement Remonſtrances againſt it to their Court. The King of *Spain* began to be alarm'd; and finding by the Nature of this Negociation that a Proviſional Accommodation was like to be made, and the Congreſs ſeparated without any thing being fix'd and accompliſh'd by the Imperial Court that might anſwer his Views in Favour of his Family,

Family; he extremely reſented ſuch a Treatment, and by his warm Repreſentations againſt it to the Emperor, he prevented the ſigning of that Treaty. However, the Conduct of the Imperial Miniſters in theſe ſeparate Tranſactions, and the framing a Plan with ſo little Regard to the Intereſt of *Spain*, made ſuch an Impreſſion upon that Crown, and occaſioned ſo much ill Humour and Diſguſt; that from bitter Expoſtulations, *Spain* came in a manner to a direct Breach with the Imperial Court; which ſet a Negociation on foot between the Allies and *Spain*, and had the good Effect of ſeparating that Crown from the Emperor, by the happy Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

From what hath been ſaid, I think it undeniably proved, that Matters could never have been brought to ſo good a Situation, if we had neglected to concert the Meaſures, and provide the Forces we did, or if we had haſtily disbanded them. It would have been the ſame Caſe, as if when two Armies were ranged in Battle Array, and ready to engage, and the Generals had, to prevent the Effuſion of Blood, agreed to a Parley, one of them, before he ſaw the Succeſs of that Parley, ſhould have been ſo wiſe as to disband his Army: Such, I ſay, would have been our Caſe and our Wiſdom, had we,

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upon ſigning the Preliminaries, and upon the Meeting of the Congreſs, disbanded our Forces without waiting for the Succeſs of our Negociations.

I know it will be ſaid by the pretended Patriots, Where are theſe Advantages of Peace and of preventing a War, if we ſtill continue to be at the ſame Expence as if we were actually in a War? Theſe Words have nothing in them but Sound; the Advantages of Peace appear by the Security of our Poſſeſſions, and the full Enjoyment of our Commerce: And can the Expence of twelve thouſand *Heſſians*, and of four thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty nine Men; which was the whole Increaſe of the *Britiſh* Forces, from the ſigning of the Preliminaries to the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville*, beyond what was kept up before the Treaty of *Vienna*; be compared with the great Augmentation of Forces neceſſary, and the Train of extraordinary and contingent Expences unavoidable alſo, in caſe of a War? without ſaying any thing of the uncertain Succeſs of Arms, and where and to whoſe Advantage the Events even of a ſucceſsful War might turn.

Theſe Conſiderations are ſo obvious, that every prudent and impartial *Engliſhman* muſt conclude,

conclude, that preventive Meaſures, altho' the Operations are ſlow and gentle, are, to a free and trading Nation, preferable to the dazzling Glory and Eclat of military Actions. No body thinks that it is either a pleaſing or deſirable thing to keep up more Forces than uſual, in time of Peace: But if our Rights and Poſſeſſions are threatned, we muſt provide and prepare for a War, and even risk one for the Preſervation of them; and if by the Continuation of ſome more than ordinary Expence, theſe Rights and Poſſeſſions can be ſecured until an abſolute Peace can be ſettled by Negociation; it may not be the moſt deſirable Situation, but ſurely much preferable to that of War.

Theſe were the Motives and Reaſons for the Augmentation and Continuation of our Forces; ſince the making of the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover*, to the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

The Augmentation diſappointed the dangerous Deſigns of the *Vienna* Treaty, prevented a War, procured the ſigning of the Preliminaries, and the Meeting of the Congreſs. The Continuation of the Troops during the Congreſs, enabled the Miniſters of the Allies to turn the Negociations to their Advantage; to ſeparate *Spain* from the

the Emperor; to diſſolve the Treaty of *Vienna*; and to re-eſtabliſh our Poſſeſſions and Privileges of Trade upon their ancient Foot, by the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

It comes next to be conſidered, why after theſe Advantages obtained, it is neceſſary to keep up any longer more Forces than are uſual in Time of an abſolute Peace.

But it may not be improper to obſerve firſt, that upon the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville*, there was an immediate Reduction of above five thouſand Men of our *Britiſh* Forces; altho' the reſt of our Allies, as well as our Adverſaries, thought fit to continue the ſame Number of augmented Forces, as they had on Foot before the making of that Treaty: So that we kept in our Pay no more than the twelve thouſand *Heſſians*, beyond what we had before theſe Troubles began; and they were continued laſt Year by the Parliament, on a full Debate, as abſolutely neceſſary for enabling his Majeſty to execute the Engagements he was under by the Treaty of *Seville*.

That Treaty detached *Spain* from the Emperor, and made an abſolute Peace between

tween that Crown and the Allies of *Hanover*.

But the Allies of *Hanover*, on the other hand, in return for the great Advantages they muſt reap from the Acceſſion of *Spain* to their Intereſt by leaving the Emperor, were obliged by an Article of that Treaty to ſecure the Succeſſion of *Don Carlos* to *Tuſcany* and *Parma*, by the effectual Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons, to the Number of Six Thouſand Men, into the principal Places of thoſe Dutchies. This was indeed a Variation from the Quadruple Alliance, by which the Introduction of neutral Garriſons only was ſtipulated for ſecuring that Succeſſion. But the Conduct of the Emperor, in endeavouring to delay and diſappoint the Introduction of neutral Garriſons, and the Succeſſion of *Don Carlos*; and the Steps taken with that View in the *Vienna* Treaty, without the Conſent of *England* and *France*, contracting Parties to the Quadruple Alliance; ſufficiently juſtified *England*, and *France* in making this Variation without the Conſent of the Emperor.

However, the Emperor made uſe of this Colour to execute the Meaſures ſince taken, of filling all *Italy* with Imperial Troops; and gave the Allies ſufficient Reaſon not to depend upon a quiet and peaceable Introduction

of *Spaniſh* Troops into *Tuſcany* and *Parma*, without being in a Condition to execute this Article by Force in Caſe of Reſiſtance; and conſequently made them think it neceſſary to keep a ſufficient Number of Troops on Foot for that End. Our Allies therefore kept up their extraordinary Levies; and ſurely, if the Advantages of the Treaty of *Seville* be conſidered as they immediately concern this Nation, no body will ſay but that we were under an equal Obligation with them, to be in a Readineſs to execute an Article of ſo much Importance: But the Neceſſity and Prudence of this Meaſure, will more plainly appear from the following Conſiderations.

1*ſt*. As to the Emperor, his Conſent or Acquieſcence muſt be obtained by way of Negotiation or Force.

That of Negotiation was certainly the moſt preferable Way, provided it was managed in ſuch a Manner as not to give *Spain* any juſt Reaſon to complain, or reproach us with being dilatory or backward in fulfilling our Engagements. But it would have been the vaineſt of all Imaginations, for us to hope that the Emperor would comply on any Terms, though very advantagious to him, while at the ſame time, we ſhould appear deſtitute of the Power and Means to make him

him apprehend the dangerous Conſequences of a Refuſal.

The Separation of *Spain* from the Emperor, and the Birth of two Princes in *France*, had made a conſiderable Alteration in the Affairs of *Europe*, ſince the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Vienna*; and might put it in the Power of the *Hanover* Allies, without any Danger to the Balance, to offer to the Emperor ſuch Proviſions for his future Security, as might remove all Apprehenſions from the Admiſſion of any *Spaniſh* Troops into *Italy*; and be a Temptation to him to conſent to that Introduction; provided he was convinced at the ſame time, that the Allies were able, by the Number of their reſpective Forces on Foot, to effectuate it without his Conſent. But if his Imperial Majeſty had found that *England* had diſbanded *all* her extraordinary Forces; the Conſequence of ſuch an Indifference on our Part, with reſpect to the *Hanover* Alliance, and to the Treaty of *Seville*, muſt have encouraged the Emperor to refuſe the moſt tempting Offers, and to wait patiently for the Event of Things; rather than conſent upon any Terms to ſecure the Succeſſion of *Don Carlos*, by the Admiſſion of *Spaniſh* Garriſons into the Places of *Tuſcany* and *Parma*.

If therefore the keeping up these Forces was necessary, even in Case of a Negotiation with the Emperor, and that the Allies should have made him any advantageous Offers to consent to a peaceable Introduction of Six Thousand *Spaniards* into *Italy*; much more would they be necessary, in Case the Emperor should resolve, in all Events, and at all Hazards, to oppose the Admission of those Troops; and consequently the Allies should be obliged to execute their Engagements on that Head to *Spain*, by Force: As they certainly must in Honour do, if the Imperial Court should any longer persevere in standing out.

2*dly*. We are obliged to continue these *Hessians* in our Pay, with Respect to our Allies; with whom we are equally concerned to fulfil the Treaty of *Seville*. *France* and *Holland* were Parties with us in the Treaty of *Hanover*; had joined their Forces and Measures with ours, for defeating the Designs of that of *Vienna*, and for preventing a War: By their Councils and Firmness united with ours, the Alliance between the Emperor and *Spain* was dissolved; by their Assistance and Guaranty we obtained an absolute Peace with *Spain*, and a Renewal and Confirmation of all our former Rights and

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Poſſeſſions; for theſe Conſiderations they readily concurred with us to promiſe that Crown the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons for ſecuring the Succeſſion to *Don Carlos:* And in order to make good theſe Promiſes, and to complete the great Work of a general Pacification, they have thought fit to keep up the ſame Number of Troops as they had before the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Seville.* And can it be ſaid with any Colour of Senſe or Juſtice, that we ſhould entirely disband ours; that we ſhould expect to reap alone the Advantages of theſe ſucceſsful Negotiations, and of a perfect Peace, leaving the Expence of executing the Articles ſtipulated in Behalf of *Spain* to our Allies; while by the Nature of the Treaty of *Seville*, it is plain, that the Intereſt of *Great-Britain*, in all Reſpects, is at leaſt as much concerned as the Intereſt of any other of the Allies, to have all the Articles of that Treaty entirely fulfilled?

3*dly.* With Reſpect to *Spain*; who hath a Right to demand of us the Execution of the Treaty of *Seville*, by the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons.

As ſoon as *Spain* had acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, *Don Carlos* had a Right to the Eventual Succeſſion of *Tuſcany* and *Parma*,

Parma, and to have that Succeſſion ſecured to him by neutral Garriſons. It was on this Condition, that thoſe Dutchies were declared Fiefs of the Empire; and this was the Price and Equivalent for giving *Sicily* to the Emperor. Ten Years paſſed without *Spain*'s being able to obtain this Security, while the Emperor hath enjoyed all this while the Equivalent for it; and had the Grand Duke died in the mean time, thoſe Dutchies would in all Probability have fallen into the Emperor's Hands; an Event as little to be deſired by *England*, as by *Spain*.

Thus Matters ſtood, when *Spain* being brought to a temper of negotiating with the Allies, offers to abandon entirely the Imperial Court, to quit her vaſt Expectations from thence, and to enter into a ſtrict Union with the *Hanover* Allies; provided they will ſecure that Succeſſion, that had been ſo long ſtipulated in Favour of *Don Carlos* by *Spaniſh* Garriſons; Time and Experience having ſhewn, that the depending upon neutral Garriſons for that Purpoſe, was a very dilatory and precarious Expedient. The Allies readily agree to this Point, as being neceſſary for the effectual Security of that Succeſſion, and juſtifiable with reſpect to the Emperor, who for ſo many Years, and

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in Breach of the Quadruple Alliance, was uſing all poſſible Means to defeat it. On this Conſideration, an abſolute Peace is made between us and *Spain*; all our Rights, Privileges and Poſſeſſions are renewed and confirm'd; reaſonable Stipulations are made for Reparations of paſt Damages; and the ſtrongeſt Obligations given for putting our Trade on the Foot of former Treaties; which Treaties are particularly ſpecified and confirmed, under the Guaranty of *France* and *Holland*. This being the Caſe, could we with Reaſon have expected or demanded of *Spain* the Execution of theſe beneficial Articles, if immediately on the ſigning of this Treaty we had disbanded all our Forces, and in a Manner declared to *Spain*, that we had got what we deſired, and had no further Concern for the Performance of what had been ſtipulated for *Spain* in the ſame Treaty? How fatal the Conſequences muſt have been to *England*, of a Conduct ſo deſtitute of common Honeſty, and common Senſe, are too evident to want any Explanation.

It may be here asked, But of what Uſe can the *Heſſians* be for the Execution of the Treaty of *Seville*, and particularly for the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Tuſcany* and *Parma*?

I ſhall not pretend to determine what will be the Plan of Operations for the Execution of this Point, in Caſe a War becomes neceſſary. But it is obvious to every body that has conſider'd the Nature of the Alliances ſubſiſting in *Europe*, and how almoſt all the Powers are ranged, and engaged on one Side or the other; that ſufficient Proviſion muſt be made for mutual Defence or Diverſion in ſome Parts, while the Vigour of the War is puſhed in others: That at the ſame time that his Majeſty and the *States*, and the Princes in Alliance with us, may be engaged to furniſh their Auxiliary Quotas of Men, Ships, or Subſidies, as may be agreed, to ſupport a forcible Attempt upon *Italy*, their Dominions in the Low Countries and *Germany* or elſewhere, may not be expoſed to the Inſults of the *Imperial*, *Pruſſian*, or *Muſcovite* Troops: That in order to prevent the Emperor from increaſing his Army in *Italy* with freſh Reinforcements from his Hereditary Dominions; or in order to oblige him to withdraw from *Italy* even ſome of the great Number of Troops that he hath already there, it may be neceſſary for the Allies to form a Plan of Diverſion againſt his Hereditary Dominions; and conſequently the Allies muſt reſpectively have a Proportion of Troops in all Parts for their mutual Defence

Defence againſt the Emperor and his Confederates, or for a Diverſion to his Forces, as the Occaſion ſhould require: For it would be impoſſible, as the preſent State of *Europe* and the Intereſt of the reſpective Powers are conſtituted, but that a War in one Part, though in *Italy*, muſt in a greater or leſs Degree, as the Plan of Operations ſhall be formed, affect the whole Confederacy on each Side; and therefore proper Diſpoſitions for Defenſive or Offenſive Meaſures, muſt be accordingly made. As the *Dutch* by their Situation are more immediately expoſed to the Forces of the Emperor and of *Pruſſia*, would it be reaſonable to call upon them to furniſh their Contingent towards a War in *Italy*, without having any Forces ready for their Defence in Caſe of an Invaſion of *Imperial* or *Pruſſian* Troops? And as his Majeſty might expect the like Inſults upon his *Hanover* Dominions, out of Reſentment for the Meaſures taken by him to make good his Engagements as King of *England*, it would be unjuſt to leave him expoſed as Elector, purely on that Account. The ſame may be ſaid with reſpect to our other Allies; and conſequently, the Twelve Thouſand *Heſſians*, although not immediately imbarked in an Expedition to *Italy*, for introducing *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Tuſcany*, would in Effect, according to the Diſ-

poſition to be made for mutual Defence or Diverſion, be employed for the ſame End.

It may here be ſaid, Well, the *Heſſians* were kept up laſt Year, and his Majeſty was enabled *to make good his Engagements*, and it was *hoped* that *a general Pacification would be the Conſequence of this juſt and powerful Alliance*; but inſtead of ſeeing the deſired Effects of it, we are no farther advanced than we were; we ſtill remain in the ſame Uncertainty, and muſt ſtill be liable to the ſame Expence; without any Hopes of ſeeing an End of it, or of enjoying the Fruits of a perfect Peace.

It is true that the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons is not yet effectuated, and until that is done, it cannot be ſaid, that the Pacification of *Europe* is eſtabliſhed, and it is in Conſequence true, that we muſt be at the ſame, and may perhaps be at a greater Expence than we have hitherto been, before that happy Period is arrived. But ſuppoſing that to be the Caſe, it is a Caſe of Neceſſity, of common Neceſſity, and we are not in a worſe Situation than our Neighbours; our Allies have continued to keep up the ſame Number of extraordinary Forces, which in Proportion hath been proved to be as great as ours; we have this Year enjoyed,

enjoyed, in all other Reſpects but barely the Charge of Twelve Thouſand *Heſſians*, the Benefits of Peace. And as to the Emperor, although he hath not given his Conſent to *Spaniſh* Garriſons, yet his Condition is much worſe than that of any of the Allies, and than it was laſt Year; he hath indeed loſt no Towns, nor Battles, but the Number of Forces he hath been obliged to march from his Hereditary Countries to *Italy*, and the great Charge he hath been at for all Sorts of Proviſions and Ammunition, to enable them to act, and take the Field, have made him ſuffer the Inconveniencies and Expence of an actual War, without having gained the leaſt Advantages from it: His Troops were increaſed beyond what they were in Time of Peace with between Thirty and Forty Thouſand Men. While he received Subſidies from *Spain*, that was no great Load upon him; but the Separation of that Crown from him, and his being conſequently deprived of thoſe Subſidies, hath flung upon him the whole Charge of above Thirty Thouſand Men more than he was able to maintain in Time of Peace. An intolerable Burthen to a Prince that is ſo deſtitute of Reſources for Money: His Attempts to raiſe Money upon his *Sileſian* Quick Silver have miſcarried here, thro' the wiſe Proviſion in Parliament againſt it laſt

Year, as well as in *Holland*, by the ſtrict Injunction given by the *States* to forbid it; and he hath felt the fatal Conſequences of this neceſſitous Condition, without ſtriking a Stroke: His Publick Lottery under the Guaranty and Protection of the Government, hath failed for ſeveral Millions of Florins: And if the Bank of *Vienna*, the Support of that Lottery, is not actually Bankrupt, yet it hath certainly very little Credit. The Additional Forces in *Italy*, beyond the uſual Complement there in Time of Peace, coſt the Emperor as I am credibly informed, Nine Millions of *German* Florins *per Annum*; which is about One Million Sterl. more than the ſame Number coſt him in their former Quarters; over and above the Contributions paid by *Italian* Princes. In the mean time the late Revolution in *Turkey* muſt have given the Emperor the greateſt Uneaſineſs and Alarm; for altho' it is not yet certain that the preſent Sultan will turn his Arms againſt the Chriſtians, yet the Imperial Court hath not received ſuch Aſſurances to the contrary as can make them abſolutely depend upon it; and it is agreed on all Sides, that both the *Venetians* and *Muſcovites* are under great Apprehenſions of the Motions and Deſigns of the *Turks*, which muſt in no ſmall Degree affect the Emperor.

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This is the preſent Situation of the Imperial Court; which may prove more advantageous to the Allies, than if they had gained an actual Victory. In this Situation it is not impoſſible, but that before the Time of Action approaches, the Emperor may, on certain Conditions, which the Allies of *Hanover* may venture to grant him, now he is ſeparated from *Spain*, be diſpoſed to conſent to the Introduction of *Spaniſh* Garriſons into *Tuſcany* and *Parma*, and by that Means compleat the general Pacification: But if he ſhould continue ſtill obſtinate, there is no doubt, but the Allies muſt join in a proper Plan of Operations to force him to it; which if concerted with Vigour and Union among the Allies, cannot, in all human Appearance, fail of having the deſired Effect.

Although this Deduction is gone into ſo great a Length, yet it ſeems neceſſary, before I conclude, to remove ſome Inſinuations induſtriouſly ſpread againſt the *Heſſian* Troops; as if they were not hired, or continued in our Pay, for the ſake and Intereſt of *Great-Britain*.

The Enemies to the Government, in order to give Weight to this falſe Inſinuation, have

have employed great Pains to make it believed, that we have been involved in the Expences and Troubles of late Years, purely on account of Pretenſions and Poſſeſſions belonging to *Hanover*. But they have never been able to produce one Reaſon or Fact during the Negotiations and Tranſactions of ſo many Years, to ſhew the Probability of ſuch an Imputation: And if I am rightly informed, not one Word had paſſed for ſome Years, before the Concluſion of the Treaty of *Vienna*, about *Bremen* or *Verden*; and at the Time of making that Treaty the late King, as Elector, had not, nor hath his preſent Majeſty, in that Quality, any Difference or Diſpute about any Poſſeſſion, with any Prince or State whatever.

It is indeed true, that ſince the Concluſion of the *Vienna* Treaty, and that his late and preſent Majeſty reſolutely ſupported the Honour and Intereſt of the *Britiſh* Crown and Nation, and would not make them ſubſervient to the ambitious Views of other Powers; and that the Emperor could not find that ſubmiſſion from the King of *England* which he expected from an Elector; Deſigns have been framed againſt his Electoral Rights and Dominions, upon Points in Appearance of no great Conſequence to the Alliances now ſubſiſting, or to the Affairs

of

of *Europe*: And therefore formed with this artful View, only to put his Majeſty under a Neceſſity (which every good Prince muſt be under in like Circumſtances) to conſult the Safety and Preſervation of his *Hanover* Dominions; and from the Meaſures taken for that Purpoſe, to raiſe a Jealouſy in the People of *England*, that the Quarrel is purely Electoral, and that *England* ought to be no wiſe concerned, nor take any Share in it.

But his Majeſty was reſolved notwithſtanding any Menaces or Danger that threatned him as Elector of *Hanover*, not to give up the Intereſt of *England*; and the Parliament being convinced, that whatever he ſhould ſuffer in his Electoral Capacity, muſt be the Effect of Reſentment, for his Majeſty's ſteady Adherence to the Good and Honour of this Nation, came to the following Reſolution.

" *That in Juſtice and Vindication of the Ho-*
" *nour of the* Britiſh *Crown, they would ef-*
" *fectually ſtand by and ſupport his Majeſty,*
" *againſt all Inſults and Attacks, that any*
" *Prince, in Reſentment of the juſt Meaſures*
" *which His Majeſty had ſo wiſely taken,*
" *ſhould make upon any of His Majeſty's Do-*
" *minions, though not belonging to the Crown*
" *of* Great Britain".

A Reſolution founded upon the Rules of common Juſtice and mutual Defence; for if the *States General*, *Sweden* or *Denmark*, who, by Acceſſion or Convention, were engaged with the *Hanover* Allies, had been attacked by any of the Confederates of the *Vienna* Treaty, the reſt of the *Hanover* Allies would have been obliged to have been concerned in the Defence of their Friend ſo attacked: *England* and *France*, and each of the Allies on their Side, muſt have looked upon it as a common Cauſe; and it would be moſt abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the Parliament of *Great Britain*, would not conſent to defend the Foreign Dominions of their own Sovereign, as well as thoſe of *Sweden* or *Denmark*, if thoſe Dominions were to be attacked on account of his being engaged in ſupport of the Intereſts of *Great Britain*; and ſtill more unaccountable it would be, if the King ſhould not, in the Quality of Elector, find the ſame Aſſiſtance from the *Britiſh* Nation, as he would be ſure of having if he were Elector only, and not King. And if we will but conſider the Electorate of *Hanover* as an Ally of *Great Britain*, under the Engagements of mutual Guaranties like any other Sovereign State of the Empire, this Queſtion is at an End; unleſs we vainly imagine, that we may lay down ſuch preposterous

poſterous Rules betwixt ourſelves and other Nations, that our Cauſe ſhall on all Occaſions be theirs, and that their Cauſe ſhall never be ours. If it were neceſſary to add any thing further upon this Head, I would ask thoſe Gentlemen who clamour ſo loudly about *Heſſian Troops* and *Hanover Dominions*; What would be the Difference, if Hoſtilities were begun in *Hanover*, or in any other Part of the World, in Alliance with us? Would not this equally be the Beginning of a general War, and involve *Europe* equally in all the dreadful Conſequences of ſuch a War?

Are we not then equally obliged both in Honour and Prudence, to prevent a War's being kindled there, as in any other Part of *Europe* in Alliance with us? And are we not engaged to repel and reſent any Injuries, Inſults, or Hoſtilities begun and committed there? Unleſs we will ſay, that the Elector of *Hanover* is the only Prince in *Europe* that is not to be regarded and ſupported as an Ally, and that the King's *German* Dominions are the only Country that is to be expoſed to the common Fate and Dangers of a Confederacy, and not to be entitled to the common Benefits of Security and Protection ariſing from the ſame Obligations. It is true indeed, there is no formal

Alliance between *Great Britain* and *Hanover*; for the Quality of King and Elector residing in the same Person, his Majesty could not contract with himself; but the Union betwixt the two Governments, and the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty, are as strongly and necessarily implied, as the most formal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them.

To conclude the Whole, I only desire that this Controversy may be confined to the true Merits of the Question, and not be perplexed and confounded with common-place Topicks, false Colours, and Misrepresentations: The single Question is, whether the taking the *Hessian* Troops into the Pay of *Great Britain*, was for the Honour and Interest of the King and this Kingdom, and whether the continuing them, is as yet equally necessary and advisable?

Those who raise all the Clamour, and stir up all the Opposition, are very sensible, that upon this Foot, the Dispute will not bear a Moment's Debate. They therefore run from the Question, and harangue upon Taxes and the Debts of the Nation, upon sending so much of our Money abroad, upon Foreign Standing Armies and Fore-

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reign Forces, paid and ſupported at the Charge and Expence of this Nation, for the Sake only of Foreign Dominions. A moſt abominable Practice! to repreſent a Matter of publick Conſideration and publick Utility, in the moſt odious and invidious Light, and in ſuch a Manner, as ſhall create the moſt Diſcontent and Diſſatisfaction, where the greateſt Veneration, Duty, and Affection are due. But to this Neceſſity they are driven, and theſe Practices knowingly and deſignedly they carry on; for they are ſenſible of the fatal Tendency of theſe malicious Inſinuations, and they know very well what would be the Conſequence, if the Parliament ſhould not conſent to continue the *Heſſian* Troops, until the State of Publick Affairs ſhall make it reaſonable and adviſable to diſcharge them.

Let them then confeſs what they certainly mean, and moſt certainly know; that to disband the *Heſſians* immediately, would be to diſſolve the preſent Alliances that the King is engaged in, and at once to diſcharge our Allies from all the Obligations they are under to do us Juſtice, and give us Satisfaction with Regard to our paſt Loſſes and Damages, and to ſecure and confirm to us all our Rights and Poſſeſſions, and

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Privileges in Commerce, which we are at preſent moſt juſtly intitled to.

For let me ſuppoſe, the Parliament ſhould begin with refuſing to enable the King to make good his Engagements, and to raiſe the Quotas and Proportions ſtipulated by the preſent Treaties: all Apprehenſions would at once be removed from the Emperor: he would immediately ſee the Diſſolution of that Alliance that can alone bring him to Reaſon: *France*, deſerted by *England*, would enter into new Meaſures, and think no more of executing the Treaty of *Seville*: the States of *Holland*, forſaken and abandoned by their ancient and natural Ally, muſt conſult their own Safety and Security, and venture no more to provoke the Reſentment of the Emperor, or any other formidable Neighbour.

What then would the Court of *Spain* do? What could they do but declare themſelves free and diſcharged from all their Obligations, and at Liberty to purſue their own Views and Meaſures. And is there any *Engliſhman* that will ſay, he had rather the World ſhould be thrown into all this Confuſion, than that the *Heſſian* Troops ſhould be continued? Let them ceaſe to com-

complain of the Diſtreſs of our Trade and Commerce, the Danger of loſing *Gibraltar* and *Port-Mahon*, the Obſtinacy of *France* in not totally demoliſhing *Dunkirk*, who think it reaſonable that we ſhould at once cancel all our Obligations of Treaties.

With what Face can they in one Breath reproach our Allies for failing in the minuteſt Points to execute their Engagements, and call upon the Parliament of *Great Britain* by one Reſolution to diſſolve all their own? Would theſe Gentlemen ſpeak out, the Nation would ſoon judge between them and their Adverſaries. Let them tell the People, without Diſguiſe, what Dangers and Hazards they would expoſe the Nation to, if they could prevail to have the Foreign Troops disbanded in this Poſture of Affairs: Let them give over the little Artifices of complaining, that we have any thing to do with the *Hanover* Dominions; and utter their Grief plainly, *That we have any Thing to do with the Elector of* Hanover. And who can help thinking but that thoſe, who are ſo mean, in the preſent Circumſtances of Things, to do the one, would readily, if it were equally ſafe for them, do the other. I mean thoſe who are the

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chief Authors and Promoters of this furious Clamour againſt the *Heſſian* Troops; for that ſeveral well-meaning Perſons have been led away by an artful Miſrepreſentation of this Point, I verily believe. But if none, who have not the ſame Views and Deſigns with the pretended Patriots, will be drawn into the Snares that are daily laid for them, theſe impotent and malitious Efforts to diſtreſs the Government at Home, will prove as vain and ineffectual as their Endeavours have been in all Foreign Courts, to embarraſs and obſtruct the Meaſures concerted for the Intereſt and Advantage of the King and Kingdom.

FINIS.